In English: EPR, the bumpy road of French nuclear power

 Studying the history of the EPRs goes back so far that it is hard to believe that it is about the same sector, still under construction.    by Paul Marion, "la Tribune de l'Économie"  26/03/2023

                                            Flamanville power nuclear station, still on construction (credit: Reuters)

Everything began at the Franco-German summit in 1989. At that time, the agreement between President Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was moving forward hand in hand and both of the then partners wanted to symbolise their cooperation in ambitious projects. What could be more strategic than the energy sector? The European Pressurised Reactor programme was officially launched in 1992. In a Europe still frightened by 1984 Chernobyl disaster, the EPR promises to deliver more power with optimum safety.

But behind the good understanding of the leaders, the relationship between the French and German engineers was far from idyllic because the opinions were too different. At the end of the 1970s and 1980s, the French nuclear industry was ultra-competitive and was being exported all over the world. Moreover, EDF was not happy to have to design a new reactor and to throw away its work on the REP-2000 reactor, the announced successor to the N4+ reactor, the last model to have been commissioned to date in France at Civaux in the late 1990s.

                                            Map of French nuclear civil sites

The French and German safety authorities also have different ideas, with Germany calling for much thicker concrete and steel protective enclosures around the reactor. Without reaching agreement, each added its own regulations to the specifications, which were designed as a cathedral of standards. Until it becomes impossible to build? "The EPR is too complicated, almost unbuildable," admitted former EDF CEO Henri Proglio during a hearing at the National Assembly.

Monster of steel and concrete

"The EPR technology is not so different from that of existing reactors. All its difficulty comes from the safety architecture, involving much more concrete, steel, and warning systems than the previous reactors," summarises Nicolas Goldberg, an energy expert at Colombus Consulting, to describe this "monster" of steel and concrete that former EDF executive director Hervé Machenaud talks about.

Unfortunately, Germany is a capricious partner, which after dictating its conditions, withdraws from the project because the government changes. Indeed, in 1998 in Germany, the ecologists who entered the government stopped the German nuclear projects. The French industrialists alone inherited a reactor design that they had not really wanted and that did not guarantee them any orders.

At the end of the 1990s, the climate became unfavourable to nuclear power in France. Under pressure from his ecologist allies, represented in the government in 1997 by Environment Minister Dominique Voynet, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin delayed launching the first EPR projects.  Impatience grew in the industry.

Two failures

Faced with the absence of work in France, French companies looked abroad for new markets and found them. In Finland, Areva, ex-Framatome (manufacturer of nuclear boilers and historical partner of EDF), won the manufacturing of two EPR reactors in Olkiluoto in the south-west of the country, together with Siemens. Too happy to have the world's first reactors built, the two companies conceded considerable discounts.

Without making her fortune, Areva's boss, Anne Lauvergeon, wants to make Olkiluoto a showcase for her company's skills in order to win other contracts elsewhere. In its obsession to outstrip its rivals, whether EDF, the Americans from Westinghouse or the Koreans from Kepco, Areva has rushed and underestimated the scale of the task when only 10% of the design study has been completed.

 What should be a pioneering work is now a financial abyss that is gradually swallowing up its resources and the company itself. The budget swelled from 3.4 to 11 billion euros, as did the deadlines, which were finally twelve years late.

Deindustrialisation and loss of know-how

For EDF, the "project of the century" began in 2007, three years after the Raffarin government's approval. At Flamanville in the English Channel, proof of the proper functioning of the EPRs must be demonstrated, at a time when Areva is bogged down in Olkiluoto. From the Baltic to the English Channel, the same unpreparedness leads to the same failure. The costs are increasing in the same way, from 3.5 to 13.2 billion euros, with twelve years of delay at the very least.

In less than two decades, the reputation of the French nuclear sector has been damaged. How to explain two almost twin industrial failures? According to the conclusions of the Court of Auditors, the fierce competition between Areva and EDF has been undermining the French industry from inside, whose skills are almost lost after eleven years without any reactor production.

"De-industrialisation, synonymous with the loss of know-how in the production of concrete and the quality of welds, has weighed heavily on Flamanville in particular. The absence of mass production sites has prevented the maintenance of a network of subcontractors due to a lack of visibility. The same difficulties can be seen in all Western countries in building reactors, EPR or not. These difficulties are not inherent to the nuclear industry," insists Nicolas Goldberg, who notes that, on the other hand, "the construction of EPRs is not experiencing these difficulties in China," which is building reactors in series throughout its territory.

 In 2007, the Chinese entrusted Framatome and EDF with the construction of two EPRs in Taishan.

The Taishan and Hinkley Point plants to make people forget the Flamanville plant

Enlightened by its previous failures and supported by the recent experience of the Chinese, EDF manages this time to activate two first generation EPR reactors in Taishan within ten years. In another export victory, EDF was commissioned in 2013 to supply two EPR reactors to the Hinkley Point plant in the UK in collaboration with the Chinese CGN. Slower than Taishan but less difficult than Flamanville, Hinkley Point C is due to be completed in 2026. It is the last of the first generation EPRs to be built.

Since 2011, a second, simplified version of the EPR 2 has been in the pipeline, based on feedback from the construction sites.

"The EPR 2 should not even be called an EPR because it is so different. Compared to the EPR 1, we are removing a containment vessel, overlays, safety circuits and buildings to make a reactor that is half the price and, above all, much easier to build than the one in Flamanville," says Tristan Kamin, a nuclear engineer who points out, for example, that "we are going from 1,700 door references to less than 70.

An immense but not insurmountable challenge

Faced with the endless difficulties of the construction sites, could the pure and simple abandonment of the EPR project have been thought of for a while? "In 2011, EDF did not see itself starting from scratch. There is a ratchet effect. The further we go, the more money we invest, the less we can turn back," says Nicolas Goldberg. The completion of Taishan and Olkiluoto, the convincing progress of Hinkley Point in the United Kingdom, two EPR 2s co-built in the United Kingdom by EDF, give grounds for hope.

The future of France's energy depends on this EPR 2 model. Its design is currently being developed to reach 70% completion when the first construction sites begin. In February 2022, in the famous nuclear boiler factory in Belfort, Emmanuel Macron announced the construction of six new EPRs, marking the end of a twenty-year period of hesitation by the State for political reasons. The Head of State set a huge but not insurmountable goal. "The industry is ready to build this major project," proclaimed the Groupement des Industriels Français de l'Energie Nucléaire (Gifen), which praised the lessons of the past and the future prospects offered by the revival of the atom.

"That's it, we're out of the woods on EPRs. In China and Finland, the reactors are running. Elsewhere, the problems have been identified, even if the enormous cost of the EPR projects, which were initially presented as more economical, remains," Tristan Kamin agrees with Nicolas Goldberg. The fact remains that today, no electron has yet come out of an EPR nuclear power plant in France. Flamanville is due to go into service in mid-2024 at the earliest. That is 32 years after the start of the EPR programme.

In italiano: EPR, la strada accidentata del settore nucleare francese

 Lo studio della storia degli EPR va così indietro nel tempo che è difficile credere che si tratti dello stesso settore, ancora in costruzione.         Dal Paul Marion, "la Tribune de l'Économie" 26/03/2023

                                            La centrale nucleare di Flamanville, Francia, ancora in costruzione (credit:                                                 Reuters)

Tutto è iniziato al vertice franco-tedesco del 1989. All'epoca, l'accordo tra il Presidente Mitterrand e il Cancelliere tedesco Helmut Kohl procedeva di pari passo e voleva simboleggiare la loro cooperazione in progetti ambiziosi. Cosa potrebbe essere più strategico del settore energetico? Il programma europeo di reattori pressurizzati fu lanciato ufficialmente nel 1992. In un'Europa provata dal disastro di Chernobyl del 1984, l'EPR promette di fornire più energia con una sicurezza ottimale.

Ma dietro la buona intesa dei leader, il rapporto tra gli ingegneri francesi e tedeschi era tutt'altro che idilliaco, perché le opinioni erano troppo diverse. Alla fine degli anni '70 e '80, l'industria nucleare francese era ultra-competitiva e veniva esportata in tutto il mondo.  Infatti, EDF non era contenta di dover progettare un nuovo reattore e di buttare via il suo lavoro sul reattore REP-2000, il successore annunciato del reattore N4+, l'ultimo modello entrato in funzione fino ad oggi in Francia, a Civaux, alla fine degli anni Novanta. (Vedi la mappa sotto)

                                            Mappa delle centrali nucleari in Francia

Anche le autorità di sicurezza francesi e tedesche hanno idee diverse, con la Germania che chiedeva involucri protettivi in cemento e acciaio molto più spessi intorno al reattore. Senza raggiungere un accordo, ognuno ha aggiunto le proprie norme alle specifiche, che sono state concepite come una cattedrale di standard. Fino a quando non diventerà impossibile da costruire? "L'EPR è troppo complicato, quasi non costruibile", ha ammesso l'ex CEO di EDF Henri Proglio durante un'audizione all'Assemblea Nazionale.

Un mostro di acciaio e cemento

"La tecnologia dell'EPR non è fondamentalmente diversa da quella dei reattori esistenti. Tutta la sua complessità deriva dall'architettura di sicurezza. Contiene molto più cemento, acciaio e sistemi di allarme rispetto ai vecchi reattori", riassume Nicolas Goldberg, esperto di energia presso Colombus Consulting, per descrivere questo "mostro" di acciaio e cemento di cui parla l'ex direttore esecutivo di EDF Hervé Machenaud.

Purtroppo, la Germania è un partner capriccioso, che dopo aver dettato le sue condizioni, si ritira dal progetto perché cambia il governo. Infatti, nel 1998, gli ecologisti entrati nel governo hanno bloccato i progetti nucleari tedeschi. Gli industriali francesi hanno ereditato da soli un progetto di reattore che non avevano voluto e che non garantiva loro alcun ordine.

Alla fine degli anni '90, il clima divenne sfavorevole al nucleare in Francia. Sotto la pressione dei suoi alleati ecologisti, rappresentati nel Governo nel 1997 dal Ministro dell'Ambiente Dominique Voynet, il Primo Ministro Lionel Jospin ritardò il lancio dei primi progetti EPR.  L'impazienza crebbe nel settore.

Due fallimenti

Di fronte all'assenza di lavoro in Francia, le aziende francesi cercarono nuovi mercati all'estero e li trovarono. In Finlandia, Areva, ex-Framatome (produttore di caldaie nucleari e partner storico di EDF), si aggiudicò la produzione di due reattori EPR a Olkiluoto, nel sud-ovest del Paese, insieme a Siemens. Troppo felici di avere i primi reattori al mondo costruiti, le due aziende hanno concesso sconti considerevoli.

Senza fare fortuna, il capo di Areva, Anne Lauvergeon, vuole fare di Olkiluoto una vetrina per le sue competenze, al fine di ottenere altri contratti altrove. Nella sua ossessione di superare i suoi rivali, che si tratti di EDF, degli americani di Westinghouse o dei coreani di Kepco, Areva sta correndo e sottovalutando la portata del compito, quando è stato completato solo il 10% dello studio di progettazione.

 Quello che dovrebbe essere un lavoro pionieristico è ora un abisso finanziario che sta gradualmente inghiottendo le risorse e l'azienda stessa. Il budget si è gonfiato da 3,4 a 11 miliardi di euro, così come le scadenze, che alla fine erano in ritardo di dodici anni.

Deindustrializzazione e perdita di know-how

Per EDF, il "progetto del secolo" è iniziato nel 2007, tre anni dopo l'approvazione del Governo Raffarin. A Flamanville, nella Manica, si deve dimostrare il corretto funzionamento degli EPR, in un momento in cui Areva è impantanata a Olkiluoto. Dal Baltico alla Manica, la stessa impreparazione porta allo stesso fallimento. I costi aumentano allo stesso modo, da 3,5 a 13,2 miliardi di euro, con almeno dodici anni di ritardo.

In meno di due decenni, la reputazione del settore nucleare francese è stata danneggiata. Come spiegare due fallimenti industriali quasi gemelli? Secondo le conclusioni della Corte dei Conti, la feroce concorrenza tra Areva ed EDF sta minando dall'interno l'industria francese, le cui competenze sono quasi perse dopo undici anni senza produzione di reattori.

"La deindustrializzazione, sinonimo di perdita di know-how nella produzione di calcestruzzo e nella qualità delle saldature, ha pesato in modo particolare su Flamanville. L'assenza di siti di produzione di massa ha impedito il mantenimento di una rete di subappaltatori a causa della mancanza di visibilità. Le stesse difficoltà si riscontrano in tutti i Paesi occidentali nella costruzione di reattori, EPR o meno. Queste difficoltà non sono intrinseche all'industria nucleare", insiste Nicolas Goldberg, che osserva che, d'altra parte, "la costruzione degli EPR non sta incontrando queste difficoltà in Cina", che sta costruendo reattori in serie su tutto il suo territorio.

 Nel 2007, i cinesi hanno affidato a Framatome ed EDF la costruzione di due EPR a Taishan.

Gli impianti di Taishan e Hinkley Point per far dimenticare l'impianto di Flamanville

Illuminata dai suoi precedenti fallimenti e supportata dalla recente esperienza dei cinesi, EDF riesce questa volta ad attivare due reattori EPR di prima generazione a Taishan entro dieci anni. In un'altra vittoria delle esportazioni, EDF ha ricevuto nel 2013 l'incarico di fornire due reattori EPR all'impianto di Hinkley Point nel Regno Unito, in collaborazione con la cinese CGN. Più lento di Taishan ma meno difficile di Flamanville, Hinkley Point C dovrebbe essere completato nel 2026. È l'ultimo degli EPR di prima generazione ad essere costruito.

Dal 2011, è in cantiere una seconda versione semplificata dell'EPR 2, basata sul feedback dei cantieri.

"L'EPR 2 non dovrebbe nemmeno essere chiamato EPR, perché è così diverso. Rispetto all'EPR 1, stiamo eliminando il contenitore di contenimento, le coperture, i circuiti di sicurezza e gli edifici per realizzare un reattore che costa la metà e, soprattutto, è molto più facile da costruire rispetto a quello di Flamanville", sottolinea Tristan Kamin, ingegnere nucleare, che sottolinea, ad esempio, che "stiamo passando da 1.700 riferimenti alle porte a meno di 70".

Una sfida immensa ma non insormontabile

Di fronte alle infinite difficoltà dei cantieri, si poteva prevedere da tempo l'abbandono puro e semplice del progetto EPR? "Nel 2011, EDF non si vedeva ripartire da zero. C'è un effetto a cricchetto. Più si va avanti, più si investe denaro, meno si può tornare indietro", afferma Nicolas Goldberg. Il completamento di Taishan e Olkiluoto, i progressi convincenti di Hinkley Point nel Regno Unito, due EPR 2 co-costruiti nel Regno Unito da EDF, danno motivo di speranza.

Il futuro energetico della Francia dipende da questo modello di EPR 2. Il suo design è attualmente in fase di sviluppo per raggiungere il livello di sicurezza di un impianto di produzione di energia elettrica. Il suo progetto è attualmente in fase di sviluppo per raggiungere il 70% di completamento quando inizieranno i primi cantieri. Nel febbraio 2022, nella famosa fabbrica di caldaie nucleari di Belfort, Emmanuel Macron ha annunciato la costruzione di sei nuovi EPR, segnando la fine di un ventennio di esitazione da parte dello Stato per motivi politici. Il Capo di Stato ha fissato un obiettivo enorme ma non insormontabile. "L'industria è pronta a costruire questo grande progetto", proclama il Groupement des Industriels Français de l'Energie Nucléaire (Gifen), che elogia le lezioni del passato e le prospettive future offerte dalla rinascita dell'atomo.

"Ecco, siamo fuori dai guai per quanto riguarda gli EPR. In Cina e in Finlandia, i reattori sono in funzione. Altrove, i problemi sono stati identificati, anche se rimane l'enorme costo dei progetti EPR, che inizialmente erano stati presentati come più economici", Tristan Kamin concorda con Nicolas Goldberg. Resta il fatto che oggi non è ancora uscito nessun elettrone da una centrale nucleare EPR in Francia. Flamanville dovrebbe entrare in servizio non prima della metà del 2024. Cioè 32 anni dopo l'inizio del programma EPR.

Bahasa Indonesia: EPR, jalan bergelombang tenaga nuklir Perancis

 Mempelajari sejarah EPR sudah dimulai sejak lama sehingga sulit dipercaya bahwa ini adalah sektor yang sama, yang masih dalam tahap pembangunan.   

                                                                        Oleh Paul Marion, "la Tribune de l'Economie" 26/03/2023

                                            Pembangkit nuklir Flamanville, sedang dibangun (kredit: Reuters)

Semuanya dimulai pada KTT Perancis-Jerman pada tahun 1989. Pada saat itu, kesepakatan antara Presiden Mitterrand dan Kanselir Jerman Helmut Kohl bergerak maju dan ingin melambangkan kerja sama mereka dalam proyek-proyek yang terbesar. Apa yang bisa lebih strategis daripada sektor energi? Program Reaktor Bertekanan Eropa atau EPR untuk "European Pressurised Reactor"  secara resmi diluncurkan pada tahun 1992. Di Eropa yang masih terguncang akibat bencana Chernobyl tahun 1984, EPR menjanjikan untuk menghasilkan lebih banyak tenaga dengan keamanan yang tertinggi.

Namun, di balik pemahaman yang baik dari para pemimpinnya, hubungan antara insinyur Perancis dan Jerman terburuk karena pendapat mereka terlalu berbeda. Pada akhir tahun 1970-an dan 1980-an, industri nuklir Prancis sangat kompetitif dan diekspor ke seluruh dunia. Di sisi lain, EDF tidak senang harus merancang reaktor baru dan membuang hasil kerjanya pada reaktor REP-2000, penerus reaktor N4+ yang telah diumumkan, model terakhir yang telah ditugaskan hingga saat ini di Perancis di Civaux pada akhir 1990-an. (lihat peta di bawah ini)

                                        

                                            Peta pembangkit nuklir di Perancis

Otoritas keselamatan Perancis dan Jerman juga memiliki gagasan yang berbeda, dengan Jerman menyerukan beton yang jauh lebih tebal dan penutup pelindung baja di sekitar reaktor. Tanpa mencapai kesepakatan, masing-masing mitra menambahkan peraturannya sendiri pada spesifikasi, yang dirancang sebagai katedral standar. Hingga reaktor baru ini menjadi tidak mungkin untuk dibangun? "EPR terlalu rumit, hampir tidak mungkin dibangun," mengaku mantan CEO EDF Henri Proglio dalam sebuah dengar pendapat di Majelis Nasional.

Monster baja dan beton

"Teknologi EPR pada dasarnya tidak berbeda dengan teknologi reaktor yang sudah ada. Semua kerumitannya berasal dari arsitektur keselamatan. Reaktor ini mengandung lebih banyak beton, baja, dan sistem peringatan daripada reaktor lama," demikian rangkuman Nicolas Goldberg, seorang ahli energi di Colombus Consulting, untuk menggambarkan "monster" baja dan beton yang dibicarakan oleh mantan direktur eksekutif EDF, Hervé Machenaud.

Sayangnya, Jerman adalah mitra yang berubah-ubah, yang setelah mendikte persyaratannya, menarik diri dari proyek karena pemerintahannya berganti. Memang, pada tahun 1998, para ahli ekologi yang masuk ke dalam pemerintahan menghentikan proyek nuklir Jerman. Para mitra perindustrian Perancis sendiri mewarisi desain reaktor yang sebenarnya tidak mereka inginkan dan itu tidak menjamin mereka mendapat pesanan.

Pada akhir tahun 1990-an, iklim menjadi tidak mendukung tenaga nuklir di Perancis. Di bawah tekanan dari sekutu ekologinya, yang diwakili oleh Menteri Lingkungan Hidup Dominique Voynet di pemerintahan pada tahun 1997, Perdana Menteri Lionel Jospin menunda peluncuran proyek EPR yang pertama.  Ketidaksabaran pun tumbuh di industri ini.

Dua kegagalan

Dihadapkan dengan ketiadaan pekerjaan di Perancis, perusahaan-perusahaan Perancis mencari pasar baru di luar negeri dan menemukannya. Di Finlandia, Areva, mantan Framatome (produsen boiler nuklir dan mitra historis EDF), memenangkan pembuatan dua reaktor EPR di Olkiluoto di barat daya negara itu, bersama Siemens. Terlalu senang dengan pembangunan reaktor pertama di dunia, kedua perusahaan tersebut memberikan diskon yang cukup besar.

Dengan tidak adanya keuntungan yang didapat, bos Areva, Anne Lauvergeon, ingin bahwa Olkiluoto harus menjadi sebagai ajang unjuk kebolehan untuk memenangkan kontrak-kontrak lain di tempat lain. Dalam obsesinya untuk mengungguli para pesaingnya, baik EDF, perusahaan Amerika dari Westinghouse maupun perusahaan Korea dari Kepco, Areva tergesa-gesa dan meremehkan skala tugas yang hanya 10% dari studi desain yang telah diselesaikan.

 Apa yang seharusnya menjadi pekerjaan perintis kini menjadi jurang keuangan yang secara bertahap menelan sumber daya dan perusahaan itu sendiri. Anggaran membengkak dari 3,4 menjadi 11 miliar euro, begitu pula dengan tenggat waktu yang akhirnya terlambat dua belas tahun.

Deindustrialisasi dan hilangnya pengetahuan

Bagi EDF, "proyek abad ini" dimulai pada tahun 2007, tiga tahun setelah persetujuan pemerintah Raffarin. Di Flamanville di Selat Inggris, bukti berfungsinya EPR harus ditunjukkan, pada saat Areva mengalami hambatan di Olkiluoto. Dari Baltik ke Selat Inggris, ketidaksiapan yang sama menyebabkan kegagalan yang sama. Biayanya meningkat dengan cara yang sama, dari 3,5 menjadi 13,2 miliar euro, dengan penundaan selama dua belas tahun.

Dalam waktu kurang dari dua dekade, citra perindustrian sektor nuklir Perancis telah rusak. Bagaimana menjelaskan dua kegagalan industri yang hampir kembar? Menurut kesimpulan dari Pengadilan Auditor, persaingan sengit antara Areva dan EDF telah merusak industri Perancis dari dalam, yang keahliannya hampir hilang setelah sebelas tahun tanpa produksi reaktor.

"Deindustrialisasi, yang dibentuk dengan hilangnya pengetahuan dalam produksi beton dan kualitas pengelasan, telah membebani Flamanville pada khususnya. Tidak adanya lokasi produksi massal telah mencegah pemeliharaan jaringan subkontraktor karena kurangnya visibilitas. Kesulitan yang sama dapat dilihat di semua negara Barat dalam membangun reaktor, baik dengan EPR maupun reaktor lain. Kesulitan-kesulitan ini tidak melekat pada industri nuklir," tegas Nicolas Goldberg, yang mencatat bahwa, di sisi lain, "pembangunan EPR tidak mengalami kesulitan-kesulitan ini di Cina," yang membangun reaktor secara seri di seluruh wilayahnya.

 Pada tahun 2007, Cina mempercayakan pembangunan dua EPR di Taishan kepada Framatome dan EDF.

Pembangkit Taishan dan Hinkley Point untuk membuat orang melupakan pembangkit Flamanville

Dibantu oleh kegagalan sebelumnya dan didukung oleh pengalaman Cina baru-baru ini, EDF kali ini berhasil mengaktifkan dua reaktor EPR generasi pertama di Taishan dalam waktu sepuluh tahun. Dalam kemenangan ekspor lainnya, EDF ditugaskan pada tahun 2013 untuk memasok dua reaktor EPR ke pembangkit listrik tenaga nuklir Hinkley Point di Inggris bekerja sama dengan CGN Cina. Lebih lambat dari Taishan tetapi tidak sesulit Flamanville, Hinkley Point C dijadwalkan akan selesai pada tahun 2026. Ini adalah yang terakhir dari EPR generasi pertama yang dibangun.

Sejak tahun 2011,  ada versi kedua EPR 2 yang disederhanakan telah dalam proses pengembangan, berdasarkan pengalaman industri balik dari lokasi konstruksi.

"EPR 2 seharusnya tidak disebut sebagai EPR karena sangat berbeda. Dibandingkan dengan EPR 1, kami menghilangkan bejana penampung, lapisan, sirkuit keselamatan, dan bangunan untuk membuat reaktor yang setengah harga dan, yang terpenting, jauh lebih mudah dibangun daripada yang ada di Flamanville," kata Tristan Kamin, seorang insinyur nuklir yang menunjukkan, sebagai contoh, bahwa "kami beralih dari 1.700 referensi pintu menjadi kurang dari 70.

Tantangan yang sangat tinggi namun yang bisa diatasi

Dihadapkan dengan kesulitan yang tak ada habisnya di lokasi konstruksi, mungkinkah pengabaian proyek EPR secara murni dan sederhana telah dipertimbangkan untuk sementara waktu? "Pada tahun 2011, EDF tidak melihat dirinya mulai dari nol. Ada efek ratchet. Semakin jauh kita melangkah, semakin banyak uang yang kita investasikan, semakin sedikit kita bisa kembali," kata Nicolas Goldberg. Selesainya Taishan dan Olkiluoto, kemajuan yang meyakinkan dari Hinkley Point di Inggris, dua EPR 2 yang dibangun bersama di Inggris oleh EDF, memberikan harapan.

Masa depan energi Prancis bergantung pada model EPR 2 ini. Desainnya saat ini sedang dikembangkan untuk mencapai penyelesaian 70% ketika lokasi konstruksi pertama dimulai. Pada bulan Februari 2022, di pabrik ketel nuklir yang terkenal di Belfort, Emmanuel Macron mengumumkan pembangunan enam EPR baru, yang menandai berakhirnya periode keraguan selama dua puluh tahun oleh Negara karena alasan politik. Kepala Negara menetapkan tujuan yang sangat besar tetapi bukan berarti tidak dapat diatasi. "Industri siap untuk membangun proyek besar ini," demikian pernyataan Groupement des Industriels Français de l'Energie Nucléaire (Gifen), yang memuji pelajaran masa lalu dan prospek masa depan yang ditawarkan oleh kebangkitan atom.

"Itu saja, kita sudah keluar dari kegagalan di bidang EPR. Di Cina dan Finlandia, reaktor-reaktornya sudah berjalan. Di tempat lain, masalahnya telah diidentifikasi, bahkan jika biaya yang sangat besar dari proyek-proyek EPR, yang pada awalnya disajikan sebagai lebih ekonomis, tetap ada," Tristan Kamin setuju dengan Nicolas Goldberg. Faktanya, hingga saat ini, belum ada elektron yang keluar dari pembangkit listrik tenaga nuklir EPR di Perancis. Flamanville akan mulai beroperasi paling cepat pada pertengahan tahun 2024. Itu berarti 32 tahun setelah dimulainya program EPR.

French nuclear sector: caught between Charybdis and Scilla

les Échos- AFP

Areva's financial statements release: progress in view?

Véronique le Billion in "Les Echos" on February, 28th

In 2015, the group recorded a €2 billion net loss. Its perspectives remain quite blurred
The Finnish EPR in construction can been seen as a « white elephant » in Areva’s financial statements. Friday, the group released a fifth year of loss, whereas it  postponed the publication of its 2015 financial statements by a day, in order to conclude its financing for this year.
Last year, this loss amounted to €2,04 billion, among which €905 million were dedicated to new provisions on « OL 3 ». This means a global loss on the Finnish project amounting to €5,5 billion. The commissioning date is still fixed for late 2018. These provisions include for the first time a figure reflecting the progress made in the discussions with TVO, the Finnish client, « in order to settle the basis for the successful completion of the works and the settlement of the dispute », explained Philippe Knoche, Areva’s CEO.  Indeed, both parties consider the other as responsible for the 10-year delay of the construction, Areva-Siemens claiming €3,52 billion from TVO, and TVO replies by claiming €2,6 billion. Now looking for an amiable settlement of the dispute, « both parties consider to have reached significant progress », said the group in a press release. Discussions are only « a kind of prerequisite », said Philippe Knoche, still cautious.
« A Finnish-special environment »
The provisions on OL 3 include some operational overcosts on the construction site, together with « an increase of the costs and risks on the test phases » of the reactor, which have just begun and which have taken into account « the return of experiment made during the first trials of Taishan » (the first EPR in trial phase in China) and from the « Finnish-special environment », a kind of implicit reference to the difficult relations with Stuk, the Finnish safety authority.
Beyond 2015 net loss, which takes into account the costs of the present unemployment scheme, the turnover of the « new Areva », centered on the fuel cycle (mining, converting, enriching, retreating used fuels…) increased by 1.9% at constant scope of consolidation and exchange rates, namely €4,2 billion. The turnover of the transferred activities (namely the Areva NP division,  but also including the activity of  Areva TA : research and defence reactors, Canberra, the subsidiary of measures, the renewables…) is set at €4,01 billion (-8,4%), with new provisions relating to wind and solar agreements.
No turnover forecasts
As the group fights hard for its restructuration, the risk may come from the under-development of its markets, which suffer from an atone demand and overcapacities. Areva has thus given only an objective, namely a level of net cash flow of €-2 and €-1,5 billion. « Because of our present position, we focus on the management of the net cash flow of the activities, and we postpone other directions », justified Stéphane Lhopiteau, Areva financial manager.
Areva has not recorded a turnover forecast this year, nor for the following ones. « In the coming months, we will communicate about our perspectives », promised Philippe Knoche. Even if the book order of the new Areva has recorded an amount equivalent to seven years of turnover (namely €29 billion), it consumes itself quicker than it’s renewed : the amount decreased by 9,7% last year ; in mining particularly « we don’t intend to take as many orders as sales, because of the present price », indicated Philippe Knoche. Nevertheless, the group has revealed that long term agreements were signed with EDF in February, for used fuel retreatment and for uranium conversion and enrichment, for some billions of euros.
For now, Areva’s priorities will consist in notifying its recapitalisation to the European Commission, although its indebtedness has increased by €6,3 billion (+€0,5) and in « progressing » on OL 3 project and on transferring Areva NP to EDF. Then, the group will be able to come back to investors which have expressed their interest in entering in Areva’s capital, like CNNC, from China, or investors from Japan.

Lemonde.fr

Constructive talks between Areva and TVO on OL 3

Véronique Le Billion, "Les Échos", February, 19th

According to several sources, Areva and TVO, its Finnish client, are discussing « in an open way »
On January, 20th, Emmanuel Macron, France Economy Minister, said he gave a one-month deadline to Areva and TVO, its Finnish client, in order « to find a possible settlement » for the dispute opposing both companies about the construction of an EPR reactor on the Olkiluoto site, in Finland. A month later, nothing has been yet settled but, according to several sources, discussions are progressing positively. « Each partner intends to settle the dispute and all discussions are made in a positive environment », said a source close to the case. « Discussions are intense. TVO intends to find a solution », adds another source. In Helsinki, at TVO headquarters, no comment is made nonetheless.
Settling the case « OL3 » is of significative importance for the restructuration of the French nuclear sector, which has been in fact necessary because of the quasi bankrupcy of Areva. Indeed, TVO has been awarded a control right on any possible direction change in Areva boarding council, according to the clauses of the turnkey agreement signed in late 2003. But EDF, which is on the verge to buy Areva NP, namely the reactor division, which manages this OL3 agreement, does not want to take responsibility of the project. For some good reasons : the construction has faced a 10 years delay and Areva has already recorded an €4,6 billion of provisions for foreseeable losses on the project.
Seeking a global agreement
In order to boost the restructuration in view, Paris has suggested transferring the OL3 agreement to Areva SA, the holding of the equipment manufacturer. But TVO rejected this option, fearing that the transfer of the  ownership of the agreement to Areva NP  would hinder the access to the related human and financial resources needed for the construction completion. « Splitting up the agreement from the resources is a significant matter of concern.  Completing quickly OL3 should be the main objective of the restructuration of the nuclear sector presently expected in France », explained Lauri Virkkunen, TVO’s CEO, in « les Échos » recently. It seems that discussions help to understand better the expectations of both parties, as this program (OL3 completion) has been still in the core of the incoming measures, which would appoint EDF as Areva’s contractor. The announce of a €5 billion recapitalisation of Areva SA also improves relations between parties. Indeed TVO has no interest in weakening further the image of the French nuclear sector.
The second thorny issue of the case consists in the international arbitration still pending between Areva and TVO, the first, allied with Siemens as partner, claiming €3,52 billion to the Finnish, and in return the Finnish claiming the amount of €2,6 billion from Areva. « Areva is working to find a global agreement with TVO », said a source close to the case.
Presently, it’s not at all sure that discussions will close the subject before Areva’s financial statements release, on February 25th. According to our information, the group shall record some €300 or 400 million of additional provisions on OL3 project accounting for the past fiscal year, which would increase its net loss from €1 billion to €1,5 billion.

The major refit of nuclear power plants arises the concern of the Court of Auditors

Anne Feitz, "Les Échos", February 10th

Wise Men are concerned with the recruiting and training costs arising from EDF investment program and from uncertainties because of the energy transition law.
Highlighting investments in heavy maintenance and in renovation of the nuclear park which shall be supported by the power operator by 2030, this program is of major concern for them, particularly from two points : needs of recruiting and training by 2020, and uncertainties arising from the energy transition law, particularly from the official target intending to reduce the nuclear part in the national energy mix, so that nuclear power would reach 50% of the total (conversely to the present 70%).
In 2011, EDF launched its project « main refit », not only to meet the new safety rules elaborated after Fukushima accident, but also to lengthen the lifespan of its 58 reactors in function, from fourty years to sixty. The power operator has recorded an amount of €55 billion for this program over the 2014-2025 period, and the Court of Auditors has agreed on this amount.
Insufficient involvement of the State
Nevertheless, the Court has highlighted a longer period, namely from 2014 to 2030, where the expenses will reach some €100 billion (€75 billion of investments and €25 billion of operations). The Court considers that these investments won’t impact significantly power price, compared with today’s tariffs. But the Court observes that this price has  increased between 2010 and 2013, namely from €49,6 to €59,8 per megawatthour (euro/MWh), to reach a peak at €62,6 per MWh in 2014, « because of the sharp increase of maintenance investments ».
Wise men observe that EDF projects in the nuclear sector, this program included as well as new nuclear power plants in France and abroad, shall need 110,000 new positions by 2020, either direct or undirect positions, among which 70,000 will need the professional A-level to the master level. Although two third of the companies of the sector face difficulties to recruit staff in some specialties, like piping/welding, fittings, or technical consulting.
« EDF has also highlighted a lack of executive resources, whereas training for such positions is quite long », they wrote. They insist in implementing trainings and promoting such trainings, and they regret the present wait-and-see attitude of the State. « The mobilisation of actors is not corresponding to the challenges in course in the field of recruitment and training. The State faces difficulties in implementing the right measures, particularly in the field of training ».
Shut down of some 17 to 20 reactors
The second concern of the Court of Auditors applies to the target, written in the law, to reduce the nuclear part to 50% of the electric mix by 2025. « If power consumption and exports stay at their present level by 2025, this target would entail a reduction by a third of the nuclear production, namely the equivalent of 17 to 20 reactors », wrote the authors of the report, hammering in black and white the main stance hold by various experts, since months.
No valuation has been made about the impact of this law, but this regulation will convey consequences on EDF assets : the loss of yearly revenus will amount to €5,7 billion, the decrease of operational expenses will reach some €3,9 billion, the reduction of maintenance investment will account for €1,5 billion… without taking into account the loss of capital gain on the operator’s asset or the impact on employment.
The Court insists on the need to implement such a valuation, in the framework of the energy comprehensive multi-year program, which shall set the role of the different energy sources, and due to be released in « April or May 2016 ». It is not sure whether such wish will be raised as the Energy Minister, Ségolène Royal, indicated that the program shall integrate « a set of hypotheses, which will lead to different results… »

Today's article will deal with Areva's present crisis although the company is a world champion.
Here are the views of Anne Lauvergeon, former CEO of Areva:

Anne Lauvergeon and Areva's present crisis

Anne Lauvergeon, about Areva’s crisis: “I have got my share of responsibility”

Les Échos

VERONIQUE LE BILLON / DEPUTY HEAD OF DIVISION AND DAVID BARROUX/ EDITORIALIST/ ON MARCH. 13TH

After Areva’s sky-rocketing losses, Anne Lauvergeon criticizes some kind of “untruth”. She highlights the State’s obligations, then Fukushima consequences and unveils details about the mining division.

Last year, Areva recorded nearly a €5 billion loss. In what way are you responsible of this?

Four years ago, I left Areva after two mandates. As everyone, I was surprised and shocked, mainly because all financial analysts following Areva were recommending it as an investment, before November 2014 profit warning. Having spent ten years at the head of a group, I have compulsorily a share of responsibility and I am still linked to this company and to its staff. But I can’t bear anymore the kind of untruth, which are leaking here and there.

Areva : History

Nevertheless, Areva’s history is the same as yours?

In 2001, Areva was registered, following the common political expectations of a right-wing president and a left-wing government, including environmentalists. The public authorities were aware that it was high time to stop the dissentions between Cogema and Framatome and that it was time to integrate these companies. This model has been deemed relevant, as Rosatom, in Russia, has subscribed to the same strategy. The president and the government agreed on the fact that a €3 billion increase in capital was necessary to redeploy Areva’s industrial capabilities, which dated back from the seventies. But I regret that the increase in capital has been postponed many times. Only in 2010 the group was able to rise €910 million. It should have been enough. But there were two upheavals. First an energy crisis happened in Europe, whose consequences are as follows: Alstom was compelled to sell its energy division to General Electric, GDF Suez recorded some €15 billion depreciations in 2013 and the German operators were doing badly. Then Fukushima changed the nuclear landscape.

But Fukushima did not weaken all the nuclear operators to such this extent…

The other operators of this field are either conglomerates working in many fields like General Electric, Hitachi or Mitsubishi, or companies associated with a central state, like in China or in Russia. In the view to reduce Areva’s sensitivity in case of a nuclear accident, we diversified its activities. But the State requested to sell a third of our turnover by transferring Areva T&D in 2010 (activity of power distribution). Refocusing Areva on nuclear was a political decision.

Le Monde.fr

Thus, the blame is on the State acting as a shareholder?

The State played its part well in the Supervisory Board I knew. Nevertheless, the State took time to award Areva the necessary means to face international competition.

The Financial Authority has criticized the conditions of the Finland EPR, OL3. And all major projects come from….

The spokesman criticized many points! The Finland EPR will cost three times its initial price. Like this one built by EDF in Flamanville. Construction costs have increased everywhere in the world, because of the rise of steel and concrete price. Many major and complex projects costs have soared sharply, for instance in aeronautics with the A380 or the B777-X, as well as have done the major architectural projects: The Paris Philharmonie budget has tripled. In Finland, we have sent our best elements, like Philippe Knoche, who has been responsible for the construction. We have got a client who has refused any “change order”. An arbitration case is pending.

Lepoint.fr

But the EPR is considered as your creation?

The EPR was born in 1991, ten years before my arrival (at the head of Areva), coming from a German-French political and industrial will, involving Framatome and Siemens, then the power operators and the safety agencies. The European customers wanted this huge third generation reactor. I arrived in a company where the EPR was already designed.  Then, the Atmea reactor is my creation: that’s a 1,000 Megawatt reactor, designed jointly with Mitsubishi. In 2012, Turkey bought four reactors, such heralding the first significant order registered after Fukushima.

Lefigaro.fr

A preliminary investigation has been launched about Uramin’s acquisition conditions. Do you acknowledge a kind of strategic mistake?

In 2007, we owned several mines in Canada close to their end of life, then there were some geopolitical risks in Niger and finally, we faced a buoyant demand from our customers, mainly from China. We implemented an organic growth in Kazakhstan and Mongolia. But it was not enough. Everybody buying raw materials in the first semester of 2007 paid more than in 2009: nobody forecast the subprime crisis. After Fukushima, 10% of the world demand disappeared, which justified the mothballing of some mining projects and as such, the recording of some depreciations – I would have done the same. There is uranium in Uramin. Even there are 9,000 tons more than previously expected. Look at Areva’s reference documents published these last three years: you will find the amounts of the first two deposits. About the South African deposit: it was sold for the pathetic amount of USD5 million to Australia’s Peninsula in late 2013, who has found since then 25,000 tons of uranium, featuring operating costs lower than the present spot market price.

Shall Areva be divided?

Aggregating, dividing then aggregating: business bankers are fond of this. But today, Framatome would be dead if the company were left alone: Framatome did not get the means to finance alone the opening costs of the third generation, and facing world competition, it has been able to take profit of the profitability given by Cogema in the fuel cycle. The best solution would be a joint work between EDF, GDF Suez and Areva. Today, all conditions seem advocating this solution.

The nuclear “business model” is not yet dead, so?

No, the nuclear sector is not yet dead. This topic will be discussed during the COP 21 conference in Paris. I used to say that nuclear power is not the ultimate solution, but there is no solution without the nuclear sector. Moreover, let’s stop the “French bashing”. We can scratch the sores until the end of times, but Areva is still a world champion. But now the new nuclear sector mainly needs state financing. Our main competitors have got such financing, on the contrary of Areva. That’s a major challenge for France and all infrastructure industries. 

Véronique Le Billon, Les Echos

David Barroux, Les Echos

Going further...

http://www.neweconomics.org/blog/entry/energy-round-up-nuclear-future

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/03/04/uk-areva-results-idUKKBN0M00GO20150304

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/42b9ea00-c725-11e4-8e1f-00144feab7de.html#axzz3UZeCijAy

Read more in this blog:

http://energygeopole.blogspot.com/2015/02/edf-and-areva-face-over-cost-in-nuclear.html
http://energygeopole.blogspot.com/2014/12/nuclear-power-helps-edf-to-lower-crisis.html